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ABSTRACT
OPERATING MARKET BASED REGULATION SERVICE
USING SOFTWARE AGENTS COMPLIANT WITH
NERC'S CONTROL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Ramanujam Srinivasan
With the changing scenario for procurement of energy it becomes necessary to
understand the process of obtaining energy from a diverse set of suppliers capable of
providing substantial amounts of electric power at competitive prices. Sufficient insight has
been gained in the energy brokerage system design and planning owing to experiences in
the recently established markets especially the California market. It becomes contextual to
analyze and understand the procurement of ancillary services, which are generally bundled
as part of the wholesale energy supply chain, using a similarly competitive environment
having a number of players that provide electric power for such services.
The objectives of this thesis are: (1) to provide a simulation package for
conducting competitive auctions using software agents for the regulation service auction
market, and (2) to demonstrate the compliance of a power system, employing Automatic
Generation Control with parameters obtained from such a market, with North American
Electric Reliability Council’s performance standards. The package employs a flexible and
extensible Java-based agent development environment, MADKIT, to simulate the
auctions for regulation service, and MATLAB/SIMULINK models with a fuzzy
controller to simulate the power system. The framework is tested using a sample threearea power system, where the parameters for regulation service in the second area are
obtained from a competitive auction market. A bidding strategy based on fuzzy logic is
also designed and tested for ensuring good profit for a bidding supplier in the auctions.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Background
The power industry has been undergoing numerous changes over the past decade.
Many of the changes are due to the modification of the “way things happen”. The unified
and regulated power sector has been transformed into a diversified and deregulated
environment, where power can be traded like a commodity in the market. In the recent
days, this scenario is effectively seen in the California power exchange market [1]. The
previously vertically integrated utility system is now split into three major components:
Generation companies (Gencos), Transmission companies (Transcos) and Distribution
companies (Discos) enabling a competitive environment for provision of each of these
services. Competitive markets for energy trading are being formed as part of the
restructuring of the electricity supply industries. Since electricity is delivered
instantaneously, it is obvious that a day-ahead market requires a balancing service with
an associated real-time market [2]. In this context, the Ancillary Services market derives
importance owing to the Independent System Operator’s responsibility to provide reliable
power to the consumer along with maintaining system stability.
Software agents have been employed for a wide variety of applications involving
distributed computing and decision-making. An agent is a computer system situated
within and as a part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over
time, in pursuit of its design objectives [3, 4]. In general, they possess the following
characteristics:
•

Agents are autonomous, that is they act on behalf of the user, and goal-oriented.
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•

They contain some level of intelligence, from fixed rules to learning engines that allow
them to adapt to changes in the environment.

•

They not only act reactively, but sometimes also proactively.

•

They can communicate and cooperate with other agents in a collaborative environment
to solve complex tasks.
Distributed control and decision-making is mainly useful when the components

are geographically dispersed and there is more logic in keeping certain control decisions
localized. The auction set up for the power market would be an ideal situation for
application of distributed processing involving software agents to accomplish the
decision tasks and design objectives of the participants in the market. Though sufficient
scope and research exists in applying agents for the energy supply and demand market
[5], the real-time energy balancing market for supply of Ancillary Services, such as
operating reserves, regulation service and reactive power supply, has not matured enough
to ensure perfect competition, and hence requires further investigation for the provision
of such services.
The objective of this thesis work aims at providing a framework for the ancillary
services auction market for investigating the behavior of software agents representing the
various participants including the auction coordinator or ISO (Independent System
Operator) and simulation of the influence of such market behavior on the power system
Load Frequency Control to ensure compliance with NERC (North American Electric
Reliability Council) control performance standards. A simulation environment Madkit
(Multi-Agent Development Kit), which simulates the agents in the Java virtual machine,
is used to study the dynamics of the auction market as well as model the bidding
2
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strategies for the agents competing for providing regulation service. The results of the
hourly auctions are provided to the power system as participation factors for the winning
bidders to provide regulation service. A fuzzy-logic based controller [6] is used along
with a conventional PID controller for ensuring compliance with performance standards
for the power system Automatic Generation Control (AGC).

1.2 Outline
The thesis is organized as follows.
In chapter 2, a literature survey is presented, discussing the work done by other
researchers in defining and elaborating the procurement process for energy and ancillary
services in auction markets. The application of software agents to power systems stability
as well as their use in the competitive procurement of energy from auction markets is also
presented.
In chapter 3, a description of the power market auction mechanism is given with
emphasis on the need for such a market for ancillary services. An account of the
techniques developed for energy procurement from the suppliers by the governing
authority is provided. The concept of strategic bidding employed by suppliers to
maximize profit from the market together with optimal use of resources is explained and
an account of the costs incurred by bidding suppliers in the regulation service auction
market is also given.
In chapter 4, the software agents paradigm and its application to the regulation service
scenario is presented. The environment details of the Madkit platform and its interface
with Matlab are given. A detailed algorithm for conducting the auction for regulation
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service using agents to represent the controller, who conducts the auction market, and the
participants, who maximize their gain by bidding in the market, is provided.
In chapter 5, a fuzzy logic based bidding strategy that could be adopted by the agents for
success in the auction market is discussed and compared with a simple random number
bidding strategy to complement its effectiveness in ensuring good profits for the bidding
supplier.
In chapter 6, simulation results of the proposed system on the Madkit platform for the
agents, and Matlab/Simulink platform model for power systems compliance with the
NERC standards using market-based data are presented.
In chapter 7, the research conclusion is presented and recommendations are made for
further work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter a literature survey of topics related to procurement of energy and
ancillary services via auction markets, and application of software agents to power
systems stability and energy marketplace is given.

2.1 Work related to Energy Markets and Ancillary Services
Over the past decade, significant amount of research work has been done towards
forming rules and procedures for deregulation and implementation of profound knowhow in the economic and technical areas of power systems. Different countries adopt
different models of the electricity market applying various operating mechanisms. Sheblé
[7] introduces various auction mechanisms for the deregulated power industry with
detailed treatment of methodologies followed towards ensuring competition in all aspects
of the industry. An introduction to power market design with significant emphasis on
economic theory as applicable to energy trading markets is provided by Stoft [8]. The
plan of deregulation is to achieve efficiency through competition. In a competitive
market, suppliers adjust their output until marginal cost equals the market price and
adjust the price until the market clears i.e., supply equals demand.
Goran Strbac [9] explains the electricity trading set up in England and Wales, the
basis for selecting the appropriate market or the combination of markets, and the types of
ancillary services markets like reactive power service and frequency regulation service.
There is a stress on the need for generation companies to quantify the value of various
energy and ancillary services products in order to optimally allocate their activities in a
number of competing markets. California [10], on the other hand, has established a
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system with both pool operations, where all producers of power pool their energy into a
central dispatching agency, which ensures dispersal of energy and revenue to the
producers, and bilateral contracts, where producers and consumers of power come to
mutual agreements about transfer of electric power and corresponding revenues. The
California Power Exchange (CalPX) serves as a good example for understanding the
decision process facing producers in the deregulated marketplace. Illic and Skantze [11]
present a simplified account of the operating rules of the new energy marketplace, the
challenges faced by the producers towards reliable operation and profit making, and the
feasible risk management by the producers in the associated financial markets. From the
perspective of the power systems stability and operability, Alvarado [12] examines the
dynamics of power system markets considering single and multiple supplier and
consumer scenarios. It is stressed that the stable well-behaved markets for electric power
require consideration of the dynamics of those markets. The stabilizing price signal
reflecting the energy error and effects of congestion on the equilibrium point for the
market are discussed with simplifying assumptions on participant behavior and elasticity
of the power demand.
A simple, intuitive dynamic model for consumer/supplier response is presented by
Meng et al [13] with the energy imbalance hypothesized as the key driving term for
updating price. Numeric tests with various market update models, with detailed
generator/turbine/ governor dynamics, are developed. Eigen-values are examined and
stability regions are given for market-only dynamics and coupled system dynamics.
However, network losses are ignored and a simple approximation is made equating the
energy imbalance with the weighted sum of frequency errors. Chattopadhyay et al [14]
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and Weber et al [15] consider inclusion of pricing scheme into the economic dispatch
scheduling while using the price signal as a feedback (demand pricing and generation
pricing) to both the importing side and exporting side, and only on the load side using
Optimal Power Flow algorithm respectively. Load Frequency Control (LFC) technical
issues with deregulation are examined by Christie et al [16] emphasizing the operational
structures likely to result from deregulation.
Papalexopoulos et al. [17] describe some challenging issues in the design of realtime competitive market for electricity with deregulation. Two major forms of dispatch of
energy are examined namely, Merit-Order dispatch, where power dispatch is based on a
merit-order energy stack obtained by arranging the prices from the power suppliers in
order, and Optimal Power Flow (OPF), where an Optimal Power Flow algorithm is used
to determine power dispatched to the supplier units according to a Total CostMinimization objective. Ancillary Services auction mechanisms, operational concerns,
compliance of the participants towards committed deliverables, and various options for
settlement are presented. It gives a good understanding of the underlying principles and
procedures for competitive procurement of energy and support services. Ilic et al. [18]
provide the basic structure for a power exchange market structure for frequency control
to enable purchasing and selling of frequency control as a well-defined commodity.
Most of the above work has been focused on the basic structure for the primary
energy market, while the ancillary services have been given less focus mainly due to the
lesser quantity of sale and amount of profit that could be obtained from such a market.
There are other researchers who have worked exclusively on bidding strategies in the
competitive market to maximize supplier or consumer gains. In the auction-market based
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bidding environment, the participant’s freedom to price away from the marginal
production costs is utilized for increasing profit from the market. The notion of each
participant about the system and other participants in the market is considered as
estimates Lamont [19] and a sub-optimal bidding strategy is investigated for a two-player
case. In a similar case, Shrestha et al. [20] present a strategic bidding with respect to
ramp up rate of the power supplier where the power balance and spinning reserve
requirement are considered simultaneously. A method is proposed to optimize the benefit
of the supplier by fine-tuning its bids for ramp up rate and price while ensuring its
success in the competition with other suppliers.
Xiong et al [21] present an improved evolution based approach developed to
evolve the bidding strategy and maximize the supplier’s profit in the long run. Based on a
number of simple assumptions and simulations the authors have shown the feasibility of
the proposed bidding strategy. Stochastic and ordinal optimization based formulations
with assumptions of perfect competition are done by Wen, Zhang and Guan et al
[22,23,24] where bidding strategies are developed considering expectations of other
suppliers and the presence of a market regulator along with the application of Lagrangian
relaxation technique for solving optimal power generation. Optimal bidding strategy
considering probability of winning is examined by Hao [25] by solving differential
equations that reflect the conditions for bidders to maximize their expected payoffs. A
supplier would construct his bid as a function of his private cost and cost distributions of
other bidders. Otero-Novas et al. [26] employ mixed integer programming to simulate a
real wholesale electricity market. The expected bid prices and quantities, system hourly
prices and generation schedules are estimated, taking into account the bidding strategies
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of generators and the structure of the market. Application of fuzzy logic towards bidding
strategies in a continuous double auction is presented by Leung and He [27], where the
authors give an account of the heuristic fuzzy rules, prevalent techniques for changing the
bidding strategy and a reasoning mechanism to find the best ask/bid for a hypothetical
agent.
Building on the effort described in [2], [6], [17], [18] for Load Frequency Control
and market structure and [21], [27] for bidding strategies, a market structure for the
procurement of Regulation Service in a competitive one-sided auction market with
suppliers employing simple bidding strategies for success in supplying regulation service
to an anticipated demand is presented in this thesis.

2.2 Work related to Software Agents in Power Systems
Software agents have been in the power systems domain for quite some period
owing to their inherent qualities that tie-up well with the distributed nature of the
electrical system. Russell and Norvig [4] provide an excellent textual as well as
simulation oriented explanation of agent technology with possible application scenarios
and behavioral patterns of multi-agent systems. Ferber, Knapik, Weiss and Bond et al
[28,29,30,31] provide an account of the prevalent techniques for analyzing, designing,
and implementing multi-agent systems for a variety of applications including
telecommunications, air-traffic control, telemetry in enterprise systems, and supply chain
management. Reasoning about the state of the individual agent and its neighbors,
interaction languages like KQML (Knowledge Querying and Manipulation Language),
FIPA (Foundation of Intelligent Physical Agents) and KIF (Knowledge Interchange
Format), implementation using object-oriented techniques, and typical structures and
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applications are discussed. The realization of Distributed Artificial Intelligence or DAI to
a problem at hand is visualized as an application of intelligent software agents. Warwick
et al. [32] present many of the prevalent artificial intelligence techniques in power
systems. An account of applications of evolutionary programming, fuzzy logic rule-based
systems, neural network systems and interestingly hybrid systems, which are a
combination of any/all of the aforementioned schemas of DAI is given with experiences
from specific project environments along with relevant simulation results.
Woolridge [33] considers the problem of building a multi-agent system as a
software engineering enterprise. His article focuses on specification, implementation and
verification of such systems with reference to a number of case studies. Jennings et al.
[34, 35] present a methodology for agent-oriented analysis and design considering the
system to be developed as a computational organization with various interacting roles.
Analysis is performed using a Roles model and Interaction model for the agents at the
micro-level, while design uses the Agent model, Services model and Acquaintance model
at the macro-level. The key concepts are roles, which have associated with them
responsibilities, permissions and protocols. The methodology is illustrated with an
example business process management system. At the website agentbuilder.com [36] a
complete and comprehensive list of agent-building environments in the academic and
commercial areas, along with a description and link to the web page of the corresponding
project is provided. Amin [37, 38] explains the inherent complexity in both system
maintenance and stable operation that has resulted from the effects of deregulation and
restructuring of the energy industry. He illustrates the Electric Power Research Institute’s
(EPRI) initiative to develop new tools and techniques to enable the power system
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infrastructure to self-stabilize and maintain reliable operation when subject to failures and
destabilizing occurrences, and suggests that agent-oriented technology will be well suited
for such an application owing to its inherent distributed nature.
Application of intelligent software agents to stability analysis of power systems
has also been prevalent in the literature. Kundur et al [39, 40, 41] provide good accounts
of the various techniques like eigen-value analysis and transient stability analysis with
loss of a line and cascading failures. The majority of the work for applying software
agents to power systems stability analysis has been done by Talukdar and his team using
Collaborative Networks [42, 43, 44]. Here, C-Nets are employed to solve complex
problems by breaking them up into simpler problems and solving them using agents
operating asynchronously. The Rolling Horizon Formulation (Model Predictive Control)
is employed to break up the overall dynamic control task into a series of localized static
optimization problems, each approximating a part of the total problem task. The agents
communicate using a Collaboration protocol to find solutions to the overall problem.
Prototypical networks illustrated include the array of pendulums and standard electric
grid (IEEE 14 bus and 30 bus networks were chosen for the experiments).
Getting to the field of power system simulations using software agents, Harp et al.
[45] developed a proof-of-concept prototype tool, Simulator for Electric Power Industry
Agents or SEPIA as an agent-oriented approach to solve complex tasks arising in the new
power system operation. They illustrate the use of a simulation engine with a multi-agent
system that takes care of business processes as well as control objectives. The system is
based on component software technologies and runs on windows 32-bit platforms. In [46]
the authors Lucas and Jahromi present a framework for agent-based operation of the

11

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

power market with buyers, sellers and a coordinator. The main emphasis in this work is
finding the bidder agent commitment period, and the bidding time in the decision process
of an agent submitting bids in a Dutch auction scenario. An algorithm is presented to
determine bidder prices and amounts to enable market intelligent agents. Lam and Wu
[47, 48] suggest use of Java technology for implementing multi-agent system for
simulating electricity markets owing to object-orientation, platform-independence,
support for distributed decision-making, communication among participants and interface
with various software tools. A market simulator based on the California system has been
designed and developed using the JATLite multi-agent template environment. Java API,
JNI (Java Native Interface) is used to invoke native methods executing power system
analysis and market analysis programs.
Building on the effort described in [33], [34], [46], [47] for Multi-Agent Systems
(MAS), an agent-based single-sided auction market controlled by an Independent System
Operator (ISO) responsible for procuring Ancillary Services including regulation service
to an anticipated demand is presented in this thesis. The Multi-Agent Development Kit or
Madkit [49] environment developed using Java Beans™ Technology is used for creating
the supplier and ISO agents and running the auction for regulation service every hour for
a 24-hour period. The participation factors acquired by the suppliers are then utilized for
maintaining

the

Area

Control

Errors

of

a

three-area

example

system.

MATLAB®/SIMULINK® [50] models are used for illustration of the compliance with
North American Electric Reliability Council’s (NERC) performance standards using a
Fuzzy-Logic based controller.
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CHAPTER 3
PROCURING ENERGY USING AN AUCTION MARKET
In this chapter, focus is given on the procurement of energy from an auction
market, the terms associated with such a market, and the need for a similar auction
scenario for providing ancillary services. The California ISO model is considered here as
a primary reference for explaining the methodology for energy procurement as well as
ancillary services procurement. A summary of the terms and expressions can be obtained
from the glossary in order to understand their usage throughout the material.

3.1 Market Structure and the CalPX
Most of the market structures used for trading power in the United States involve
an auction mechanism to ascertain which generation units should be used to meet the
demand. Some areas like California also allow for bilateral trades between load and
generation. The California system consists of a Power Exchange (CalPX) to facilitate
trading between GENCOs and ESCOs (Energy Service Companies that may be large
industrial customers or customer pools acting to purchase power at the least cost when
needed by the consumers) and serves as a good example for understanding the process of
acquiring the required power from an auction market. A supplier wishing to sell power
supplies a bid curve to the exchange that reflects the power delivering capacity of that
supplier as a function of market price. Such bid prices are submitted on an hourly and
day-ahead basis and a different bid curve may be submitted for each of the 24 hours of
future operation. Similarly bid curves are obtained from consumers wishing to utilize
power at corresponding prices.
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The bids from either side are used to compile aggregate supply and demand
curves for each hour. The intersection of the supply and demand curves determines the
Market Clearing Price (MCP). Now, all supply bids with a price less than the MCP are
accepted and those bidders are paid the MCP, while all demand bids higher than MCP are
accepted and bidders are charged the MCP. Thus, the balance is ensured between supply
and demand and the PX remains revenue neutral. Figure 3.1 provides a pictorial
illustration of the relationship between the bidding entities in the market and the
governing entities. With this organizational structure in place there exist other variations
and types of markets for procuring energy.

GENCO

IPP

Bilateral
Contracts

Brokers

Power Exchange
Or ISO
ESCO

DISCO

Others

Figure 3.1: Organizational Structure of the power market

Among the various market structures are the markets that include cash, futures,
planning and swap markets. The cash market undertakes trading in spot market that
reflects real-time power trading and forward contracts that reflect trading for power
interchange at a future time The futures market facilitates trading of what are termed as
futures and options, which are a means of risk management in power trading. While the
planning market is intended towards trading of contracts aimed at system expansion, the
swap market establishes trading between markets when the participants desire conversion
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from one type of contract to another. Further explanation and investigation of these
markets and the relations between them is beyond the scope of this work.

3.2 Bidding Strategies
There exist a number of ways in which the participating suppliers of energy
namely Independent Power Producers (IPP), Generation Companies (Gencos) or any
other producers capable of selling their power can maximize their net worth or profit
from the auction market. Also, in a dual auction environment, there exist consumers, who
can be large industrial entities, Distribution Companies (Discos) or any other consumers
capable of buying their required power from the market. These consumers of electric
power can also implement simple, intuitive bidding strategies or intelligent, elite
strategies based on gaming theory and optimization to increase the benefit they would
obtain from the auction market.
The ISO or PX would implement an optimization algorithm to dispatch the bids in
an efficient manner based on maximum social benefit, least cost formulation or least loss
formulations. Among the various methods employed by the participants in the auction the
most prominent would be optimization-based techniques that aim at maximizing or
minimizing an objective function that characterizes the cost or benefit function of each
individual participant in the auction. This function could very well be one that reflects the
variable costs associated with fuel procurement and O & M (Operation and Maintenance)
costs. These methods are generally termed as bidding strategies aimed at maximizing the
benefit to the bidder from the competitive set up.
Microeconomic theory holds that the optimal bidding strategy [5] for a supplier is
to simply bid marginal cost. When a generator tries to exploit imperfection in the market
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to increase its profit from the market, it is said to employ strategic bidding. Among the
various ways to employ strategic bidding, probabilistic methods and fuzzy methods of
estimating bid values or behaviors of the other participants in the market are among the
prominent techniques.
The market operator generally employs a merit-order based dispatch procedure, or
an optimal power flow (OPF) based dispatch procedure, to procure power from the
participants in the supply side, which is the side with greater competition among the
bidders. Several citations [15, 19, 22] can be offered from the literature describing the
nuances and procedures involved in these mechanisms, which have proven quite effective
in achieving their primary purposes of procuring electric power in a competitive manner.
The main idea here is to understand the existence of several methods to procure power
from bidding suppliers and briefly preview the objective function based techniques.
Similar techniques, often simpler in nature, are employed to procure power for balancing
services such as regulation, spinning reserves and replacement reserves using competitive
auction markets.

3.3 Auction market for Ancillary Services
Since electricity is delivered instantaneously, it is obvious that a day-ahead
market requires a balancing service with an associated real-time market. In this context,
the Ancillary Services market derives importance owing to the ISO or Independent
System Operator’s responsibility to provide reliable power to the consumer along with
maintaining system stability. The ISO must ensure that there is sufficient capacity among
available generators to participate in the real-time market and secure enough reserve
capacity to keep the system operating reliably. Though sufficient scope and research
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exists in applying agents for the energy supply and demand market, the real-time energy
balancing market for supply of Ancillary Services, such as operating reserves, regulation
service and reactive power supply, is not mature enough to ensure perfect competition
and hence requires further investigation for the provision of such services. . Such a
separate reserve auction is better in the market structure where the ISO does not have any
direct bondage with the Power Exchange (PX), which takes care of the functioning of the
forward energy market.
Considering a one-sided auction for regulation service the following section
examines the costs and payments the bidding suppliers are entitled for setting aside a
portion of their capacity for such service.
3.3.1 Capacity Reservation and Energy Prices
Generators provide Automatic Generation Control (AGC) services by reserving a
portion of their unloaded capacity for use in real-time by the ISO, and these can be made
available within a 10-minute period. There are two types of costs associated with such
markets where capacity is reserved in advance and later dispatched in real time. These
include the opportunity costs associated with providing the service and the actual cost
incurred during real-time dispatch of power.
The general cost function used for studies is a quadratic approximation of the total
costs involved in providing power by the bidder ‘i’ that would include fixed costs for
infrastructure as well as variable costs for fuel procurement and Operation and
Maintenance costs.
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This function is given by:

[C (P ) = α + β * P
i

gi

i

i

gi + γ i * (Pgi )

2

]

(3.1)

α i , β i , γ i : are constants that reflect approximated cost parameters.
An infra-marginal unit incurs an Opportunity Cost (cost of an opportunity lost to
bid in the real-time market for energy) for providing regulation service since it is
constrained by ramp-rate limitations. Hence, there occurs a need to provide for the
opportunity costs in the bids submitted by such units in the auction in terms of a Capacity
Reservation Bid ( Ri ). In the case of AGC, a unit is required to operate above its
minimum output in order to allow movement in upward and downward directions. Since
no unit would prefer to operate at higher levels when the market price is lower than its
costs, it is entitled to bid for a capacity payment to cover the actual costs the unit may
incur during operation.
The value of reservation capacity bid, Ri is given by

Ri = β i + 2 ∗ γ i ∗ (ri ∗ T );

(i = 1...n)

(3.2)

Where
n:

the number of participating bidders

ri :

the ramping rate of the unit (MW/min)

T:

the ramping time given by ISO (Minutes)

β i , γ i : The values in the cost function Ci(Pgi)
This Ri reflects the opportunity cost incurred by the unit in providing regulation service
limited by its ramp-rate.
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The other cost associated with the bidding is the Energy Bid ( Ei ), which is the
general cost function of the bidding entity. Successful bidders from the auction are paid a
capacity reservation payment that reflects their opportunity costs, and also paid for power
if they provide it during real-time.
The value of the energy bid, Ei

(i

E i = β i + 2 * γ i * Pgi ;

= 1 ... n )

(3.3)

This actually reflects the Marginal Cost incurred by the unit in providing power Pgi.
With these two costs incurred by the bidders, the auction considered here takes into
account a two-part bid for deciding the successful bidders and the MCP.
3.3.2 Participation Factors for the bidders
During the operation of AGC (Automatic Generation Control), each generator is
required to provide some amount of power for the service in a particular control area to
maintain the frequency within the required limits. In other words, each generator is
required to participate in the frequency regulation service according to a pre-determined
level along with the other generators in the control area. This is referred to as the
participation factor of the generator in providing regulation service. As illustrated in
Figure 3.2, an auction market, where the GENCOs compete to procure more participation
in the service by strategic bidding, could determine the participation factors.
In an auction set up, the participation factor would be determined for each bidding
hour by dividing the allocation done for each successful supplier from the outcome of the
corresponding hour-auction by the forecasted demand for regulation for the particular
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period. The forecasted demand is generally determined by examining historical data for
the hour of operation and also by studying the weather trends and consumer behaviors.
For each hour in the auction market, corresponding participation factors are obtained for
each the successful bidders who are paid the Market Clearing Price. These factors are
later used during the actual dispatch hour of the next day when there is a need to actually
provide power for regulation of frequency in the control area.
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Figure 3.2: Participation Factors obtained using a Competitive Market
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CHAPTER 4
SOFTWARE AGENTS BASED AUCTION MARKET FOR
REGULATION SERVICE
In this chapter, the important details of the solution environment for simulating
regulation service auctions using software agents are provided. While the first section
explains the Agent Group/Role model and the agent-based software engineering approach
for this market, the ensuing sections explain the algorithm executed for running the
auction and procuring service by the controller agent.

4.1 Agent Architecture for Collaboration
Some of the qualities to be present in an agent development platform for agent
collaboration and cooperation are:
•

Need for a robust communication environment for ease of message transfer among
the agents.

•

Need to work together to achieve some predefined global objectives while completing
their local operations.

•

Need to use a generic, customizable and scalable platform.

•

Modular construction in order to define and simulate working of the agent quickly.

•

Ease of work with respect to using Agent Communication Languages – No emphasis
on a specific ACL.
An auction market implementation would be close to a Decision Making System

composed of agents performing corresponding roles in the automated system for the
entities in the real world system [33]. The agent specifications should be capable of
capturing at least the following information:
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•

The beliefs the agents have;

•

The ongoing interactions the agents have with their environment and among
themselves;

•

The goals that agent will try to achieve;

•

The actions that agents perform and the effects of these actions.
Auctions are similar to a Contract-Net Protocol application, where a manager agent

with a task to perform puts it out to tender to a number of contractors agents. The
contractors willing to perform the task return bids to the manager that are evaluated by
the manager according to some criteria, and the contractor with the best bid is allocated
the task. It is however important to identify the flow of information among the agents. It
would be useful to adopt the Agent/Group/Role model [34] as shown in figure 4.1 to
define the various participating agents and their roles in the regulation market. Objectoriented analysis and design can be performed identifying each agent as an actor
performing tasks to achieve its design objectives.

Figure 4.1: Agent/Group/Role model
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The Group is an identifiable entity that consists of Agents, which are members
handling one or more Roles defined within the group. While there can be more then one
agent performing the same role within a group, there cannot be two roles for the agent
with identical nomenclature and definitions.
There is a perception to view an organization as a collection of roles that have
specified relationships with one another and hold systematic interactions with other roles.
Collections of roles are aggregated into groups and an agent can hold distinct roles in
many groups. While an agent is considered as an active communicating entity, the group
is a means of agent aggregation and the role is an abstraction of an agent function, service
or identification within a group.

4.2 Madkit and its Interface with Matlab
Madkit [49] is a versatile agent development platform built using the Java
Beans specification and the agent/group/role paradigm. It is a generic, highly
customizable and scalable with a goal of providing a foundation layer for various agent
models, and to make the basic services extensible and replaceable. It is a set of Java
classes that implements the agent kernel, the various libraries of messages, probes and
agents. It includes a graphical environment and many system and demonstration agents.
The platform has three basic design principles (Figure 4.2):
•

Micro-kernel architecture

•

Agentification of services

•

Component model for graphical interface

23

CHAPTER 4 SOFTWARE AGENTS BASED REGULATION SERVICE

The idea is to provide a modular development environment with minimum
resource requirements for building customized agent applications with no work from the
developer towards system activities. The developer need only to concentrate on the
architecture, goals, and other application aspects for the agents without having to look
into communication, addressing and other services.

Figure 4.2: Madkit Architecture for Agent Development

The interface between Madkit and Matlab is established using the JMatLink
software Java class library [51] that provides a .dll file to call Matlab routines. The basis
of this function is the Java Native Interface (JNI) method declaration within the JMatLink
class and the corresponding C language implementation calling Matlab routines. The
‘mex’ file utility is used to enable C language syntax commands to call Matlab
commands and execute them inside the Matlab engine previously invoked using the
engOpen() method. With calls to Matlab computational scripts and functions from the
agent bean in Madkit, a lot of additional functionality can be implemented into the
agents.
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4.3 Auction Market for Regulation Service
The reserve auctions differ in a number of ways from the regular energy auction
market. While the main aim of the PX auction is to facilitate trade of electricity between
buyers and sellers, the procurement of ancillary services is the sole responsibility of the
ISO, which “reserves in advance” a portion of the unloaded capacity of the participating
bidders. The ISO pays the successful bidders for the reserved capacity as well as for the
energy used during run-time for energy balancing.
4.3.1 The Auction Process
The implemented market structure assumes that there exists a separate market for
regulation service. The ISO procures regulation service from bidding suppliers in the
following steps:
•

Each of the bidders submits an Energy Bid ( Ei ) in $/MWh and a separate
Reservation Capacity Bid ( Ri ) in $/MW to the ISO at the beginning of each auction
for the corresponding hour during the next day.

•

After receiving all the bids, the ISO builds what is called the “Energy Stack” in which
the bids are arranged in ascending order of bid prices. In this implementation the sum
of both parts of the bid is used while building the energy stack.

•

The forecasted demand or required capacity is filled starting from the lowest price
point on the stack working upwards until the capacity needed is satisfied.

•

The last price at which the required capacity is filled is termed as the “Market
Clearing Price (MCP)” in $/MW.
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•

The successful bidders are the ones below the MCP in the energy stack and are paid
their capacity bids initially to compensate for their opportunity costs. Their energy
bids are the amounts paid to them when they are called upon to provide energy at runtime.
A pictorial representation of the auction process is shown in Figure 4.3. The

bidders compete against each other in the open market to secure a position in the dispatch
stack and deliver as much power as possible as a profitable price. In this context, the
bidding strategy employed by the bidder plays a significant role in ensuring success for
the bidder.
1
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Figure 4.3: Auction Market for Regulation Service

Among the different ways in which payments are paid to the suppliers we have
considered payment for the reserved capacity and run-time dispatch. The outputs of the
auction are:
•

The Market Clearing Price.

•

The Reservation Capacity Price C i given by
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C

i

= MCP

− E

i

(4.1)

where
MCP: the Market Clearing Price from the energy stack for the bid-hour
Ei : the Energy Bid of the successful bidder for the bid-hour
•

The participation factor for each successful bidder unit in the regulation service
during that bid-hour of operation during the next day given by:

p. f =

Capacity allocated for the bidder for the hour
Total forecasted regulation demand for the hour

(4.2)

In this implementation, there occur two payments made by the ISO to the
successful bidders, one for the regulation reserved capacity, which is the MCP from the
auction results, and another paid in real-time when the unit is called for supply of
regulation power, which is nothing but the energy bid of the bidder during the auction.
The reserved capacity price is C i , and the real-time price is the energy ‘strike’ price Ei .
The auction market participants can be implemented as Supplier agents and ISO
agent over an Internet Protocol (IP) network. The computation complexity can be
embedded into the agents to reveal the actual calculations done by the suppliers in
providing bids to the ISO controller. This approach would be more pragmatic since
bidders could be geographically distributed in a real-life situation.
4.3.2 Run-Time Dispatch and Actual Payment

It would be a good assumption to consider that the suppliers are price takers in the
auction market, where they cannot set the real-time of their commodity and have to
accept the resultant price from the auction. The successful bidders in the auction market
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are called for supplying power for regulation service at run-time according to the order of
the bids in the dispatch stack, i.e., the lower the energy bid of the bidder the better is the
chance for calling upon that bidder to supply at run-time.
For the sake of simplicity of agent implementations a competitive auction
scenario for the suppliers has been considered and the agents do not deal with issues such
as uninstructed deviations and subsequent settlements. The successful bidders in each
hour auction are paid the MCP from that auction for their capacity reservation initially.
When called upon for dispatch at run-time the generators receive additional strike price
payment according to their energy bid during the auction. This is the form of
implementation in the California market [10] and has been adopted for the agent
simulation and auction automation process in this work.
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CHAPTER 5
FUZZY SYSTEM DESIGN FOR BIDDING STRATEGY AND
COMPLIANCE WITH NERC STANDARDS
In this chapter, the two types of bidding strategies implemented to improve the
profit obtained by the supplier agents in the auction market are explained. While the first
section explains the Fuzzy Logic based Bidding Strategy, which proves to be effective in
ensuring good profits for its agent, the second section explains the design of the Fuzzy
Controller that ensures compliance with NERC’s performance standards for the operating
power system. Figure 5.1 shows a snapshot of the simulation performed on Madkit. With
the strategies in place, it provides an opportunity to study the working of the market when
each of the bidders chooses a different strategy for making more profit from the market
or enters the dispatch stack after a failed attempt.

Figure 5.1: Snapshot of simulation using Madkit platform
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5.1 Uniform Random Number based Bidding Strategy
The profit obtained by a successful supplier agent depends upon the extent to
which its bid price is lower in the dispatch stack. In the random number strategy a
random number is initially generated that follows a uniform gaussian distribution [21].
This number is then added or subtracted from the previous value of the bid amount
depending upon the corresponding success or failure of the supplier agent to find a place
in the final dispatch stack formulated by the ISO. The simple formula is given by:

P

new

= P

0

± e

(5.1)

Pnew:

the new bid price ($/MW)

P0:

the original bid price ($/MW), value over which bid price is changed

e:

the uniform random component
The randn(1) function in Matlab is used to generate the random number and add it

to the original bid price if the agent has some profit or reward from the previous auction
and subtract it from the original bid price if the agent did not have any profit in the
previous auction. The randn(1) function generates a random number that follows a
uniform distribution with mean 0, variance σ 2 = 1, and standard deviation σ = 1. This
strategy, however, has a static nature with a random number being simply added or
subtracted without utilizing the extent of profit made by the agent.

5.2 Fuzzy Inference System based Bidding Strategy
This strategy employs a Fuzzy Inference System developed in Matlab using the
Mamdani-type fuzzy system. There is one input (profit value) and one output (price
change value). The membership functions for the input reward and output price change
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function are given in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 respectively. The output is varied
according to the extent to which the input profit characterizes over the input membership
functions.
The membership functions and rule base are created using the fuzzy inference
system editor in Matlab, which produces an output structure having all the attributes to
execute the fuzzy bidding strategy.
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Figure 5.2: Input Membership Functions

The input membership functions describe the extent of spread of the reward or
profit obtained by the successful supplier over the input space spanning until a value of
700. The behavior of the fuzzy inference system would be altered when the input space is
changed to span a different set of values providing scope for further investigation of the
performance of the system over different sets of input spaces.

31

CHAPTER 5 FUZZY SYSTEM DESIGN

very less
1

less

medium

high

very high

Degree of membership

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

5

10

15

PriceChange

Figure 5.3: Output Membership Functions

The rule-base for computing the fuzzy rules for processing the input to produce
the output is given in Table 5.1. This explains the rules used to transform the extent of
profit obtained by the bidder into a corresponding extent of price change to ensure
success as well as sustained profit for the bidder. Similar to the input membership
functions, the output membership functions describe the extent of spread of the price
change made for the successful supplier over the output space spanning until a value of
15. Hence, the behavior of the fuzzy inference system would be altered when the output
space is changed to span a different set of values influencing the performance of the
fuzzy system.
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Table 5.1: Fuzzy Logic Rules for Bid Change

Output (price change)

Input (profit)
Very low

→

Very high

Low

→

High

Medium

→

Medium

High

→

Low

Very high

→

Very low

Finally, figure 5.4 shows the surface plot of the fuzzy system, which pictorially
represents the relationship between the input and the output of the FIS.
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Figure 5.4: Surface Plot of the Fuzzy Inference System
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5.3 Fuzzy controller design for NERC standards compliance
Each control area is required to monitor its control performance and report its
compliance with CPS1 and CPS2 to NERC at the end of each month [2]. The control
structure implemented is a PID type controller whose control parameter is tuned by the
fuzzy rules. Specifically, when there is high compliance with CPS1, the control
parameter is gradually reduced to diminish high-frequency movement in the speed
governor’s equipments. Once there is low compliance the control parameter is raised up
accordingly. This ensures compliance with standards as well as reduced wear and tear of
equipment.
The input for the fuzzy logic rules is the information that reflects compliance with
CPS1 and CPS2. The FIS system will lower the control parameter of the PID controller
of the secondary loop of load frequency control when the value of either input rises. On
the other hand, the parameter will be increased when the value of either input reduces.
The first input to the fuzzy system is the cumulative average compliance factor
(CFac) used to find compliance with CPS1 given by:

CFac = AVG X →Y [CF1 ]

(5.2)

CF = AVGX → Z [CF1 ]

(5.3)

Figure 5.5: Time period for determining compliance
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The other input is the 10-minute window average of ACE divided by L10
(AVG10 [ACE]/L10) used to find compliance with CPS2. Both the inputs are calculated
every one-minute for firing the fuzzy logic output, which is the fuzzy gain ( α ) used to
tune the gain control parameter of the PID controller as shown in figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Operation of the fuzzy controller

The input membership functions for the fuzzy controller are shown in figure 5.7

Figure 5.7: Input membership functions for the fuzzy controller

The input membership functions for the fuzzy controller are shown in figure 5.8

Figure 5.8: Output membership functions for the fuzzy controller
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The Fuzzy Rules for inferring the output from the input is shown in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Fuzzy Logic Rules for controller gain inference

Finally, figure 5.9 shows the surface plot for the fuzzy controller
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Figure 5.9: Surface plot for the fuzzy controller
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CHAPTER 6
SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In this chapter, the details of the NERC performance standards and the
Matlab/Simulink model for a three area power system with a fuzzy logic controller for
ensuring compliance is presented followed by interaction between the market and the
power system. Simulations and results are next presented that show bidder performance
during two sets of auctions with the fuzzy strategy. The simulation results of the power
system and plots of CPS1 and CPS2 that ensure compliance with NERC standards are
later presented.

6.1 FIS based Regulation Service Compliant with NERC Standards
Regulation service provided by the generation companies (Gencos) is required to
track the fluctuations in power demand of distribution companies (Discos) to keep good
reliability, and to meet the North American Electric Reliability Council, NERC’s
performance standards namely CPS1 and CPS2 [6]. Fuzzy logic based controller is
developed for ensuring compliance with the performance standards for a test system with
three control areas and corresponding regulation loads. The signals, which determine
compliance, are used as input to the fuzzy controller, which adjusts the output of a PID
controller by a factor to administer compliance.
Each control area is required to monitor its control performance and report its
compliance with CPS1 and CPS2 to NERC at the end of each month. The control
structure implemented is a PID type controller whose control parameter is tuned by the
fuzzy rules. Specifically, when there is high compliance with CPS1, the control
parameter is gradually reduced to diminish high-frequency movement in the speed
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governor’s equipments. Once there is low compliance the control parameter is raised up
accordingly. This ensures compliance with standards as well as reduced wear and tear of
equipment.
6.1.1 CPS1 and CPS2
CPS1 is defined as follows: Over a sliding 12-month period, the average of the

“clock-minute averages” of a control area’s ACE divided by “ten times its area frequency
bias” times the corresponding “clock-minute averages of the interconnection frequency
error” shall be less than the square of a given constant, ε 1 , representing a targeted
frequency bound.
This is expressed by:

  ACE 

2
CF 12 months = AVG 12 months  
 × ∆ F1  ≤ ε 1
  − 10 B  1

Where ε1:

(6 .1 )

the targeted frequency bound

(.) 1:

refer to 1-min. averages

∆F:

interconnection frequency error

Bi:

frequency bias of the ith control area in MW/0.1Hz

To calculate the frequency-related parameter, CPS1 a compliance factor (CF) and
1-minute average compliance factor are introduced namely:

CF = AVG12− month [CF1 ]

  ACE   ∆ F
 *  2
; CF 1 =  
  − 10 B  1  ε 1

Then CPS1 is obtained from the following equation:
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CPS1 = (2 – CF) * 100%

(6.3)

To comply with NERC, CPS1 should be less than 100%.
CPS2 requires the 10-minute averages of a control area’s ACE (Area Control

Error) to be less than a constant (L10) given in the equation:

AVG

10 min

( ACE ) ≤

L 10

(6.4)

Where

L10 = 1 . 65 ∗ ε 10
B

s

=

n

∑

i=1

B

(− 10 B i )(− 10 Bs )

(6.5)

(6.6)

i

Bs:

the sum of the frequency bias settings of all control areas

ε 10 :

the targeted frequency bound for CPS2

The targeted frequency bounds considered here are ε 1 = 6.20mHz and ε 10 = 0.64mHz .
CPS2, which should be greater than or equal to 90%, is given by:


Violations month
CPS 2 = 1 −
 Total Periods month − Unavailabl e Periods

month


 × 100 %


(6 .7 )

Where Violationsmonth are a count of the number of periods that the clock-10-minute
averages of ACE are greater than L10 in one month.
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6.2 Sample Three Area System and Market Interaction
We consider a sample three-area power system as shown in figure 6.1 with the
second area consisting of bidding agents implementing the market structure for regulation
service. The outcome of each hour auction would be participation factors for each of the
generators to provide regulation service.

4 Gencos
1 Disco

Tie Line

5 Gencos
1 Disco

Area1

Area2
2 Gencos
1 Disco

Area3

Test
area for
linking
to the
market

Figure 6.1: Sample Three-Area System

The synchronizing power coefficients of the lines are
T12 = 50 MW/rad, T13 = 200 MW/rad, and T23 = 120 MW/rad.
The random components of the load are the entities that need to be compensated
by the regulation service and hence are simulated in the model using controlled random
noise signals. A vector alpha consists of participating factors of the 5 Gencos in area-2
for regulation service during any particular hour of operation. Appendix A provides a
snapshot of the Simulink models and fuzzy controller.
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6.3 Auction Market Simulation
In this section, the agent based auction system is simulated for regulation service
for the 24-hour period of the next day. An auction consisting of 5 Supplier agents is
assumed to be present along with an ISO Controller agent. An array consisting of 24
elements is assumed to provide the forecasted regulation requirement for each hour in the
24-hour operation period for the next day. The sum of the capacity bid and energy bid is
considered for building the energy stack by the ISO. Table 6.1 shows the parameters of
the five bidders, their Reservation Capacity Bids ( Ri ) and Energy Bids ( Ei ). With these
parameters for the individual supplier agents, the Madkit platform is used to simulate the
auction market.
The reward for each successful supplier is given by:

reward = (MCP − Bidprice ) ∗ ( Allocation for bidder )

(6.8)

Table 6.1: Parameters for the units in the simulation
Ramp-Rate

Ri

Ei

MW/min

$/MW

$/MWh

1

10

8.552

10.01

2

9

7.895

8.198

3

10

8.552

10.01

4

6

8.795

9.147

5

8

8.565

9.513

Unit
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The bar chart in figure 6.2 shows the forecasted demand values for the 24 hours
considered for regulation auction.
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Figure 6.2: Plot of forecasted regulation demand

For the purpose of simulation, at the end of each hour auction, the ISO agent calls
a BidPrice agent, which invokes the bidding strategy routines in Matlab for each of the
agents. The changed bid prices from Matlab are again fetched by the BidPrice agent and
sent to the Supplier agents, who participate in the next hour auction. This cycle continues
until auctions for the 24 hours. In the first example, the second supplier agent is chosen to
implement the fuzzy bidding strategy while the other agents implement the random
number bidding strategy.
The bar chart in figure 6.3 and 6.4 show the number of successful bidders during
the first and second sample runs of 24-hour auctions respectively.
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Figure 6.3: Plot of number of successful bidders in First Sample Run
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Figure 6.4: Plot of number of successful bidders in Second Sample Run
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The rewards for each of the five agents in the first sample simulation are plotted
in figure 6.5. The areas under the reward plots for each of the individual agents are
$3389.3, $6654.2, $2598.0, $1108.6 and $1571.6 respectively in the order supplier
agent1 to supplier agent5. It is observed that the second supplier agent with the fuzzy
bidding strategy has been able to make maximum profit from the auction by adjusting its
bid price value being sensitive to the extent of change in the reward value. This ensured
that the bidder was not only made good profit but was also in the stack of successful
bidders for the maximum number of times.
For the second sample simulation, the bidding strategy of Supplier 3 was changed
to be FIS strategy and that of Supplier 2 changed to the other strategy to evaluate the
effectiveness of the FIS strategy. A second 24-hour auction was conducted following the
first one with the changed bidding strategy options. The rewards for each of the five
agents in the second sample simulation are plotted in figure 6.6. The areas under the
reward plots for each of the individual agents are $1595.8, $1752.8, $3909.2, $1670.9
and $2327.9 respectively in the order supplier agent1 to supplier agent5.
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Figure 6.5: Plot of Rewards for Bidders in First Sample Run
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Figure 6.6: Plot of Rewards for Bidders in Second Sample Run

This shows that the fuzzy bidding strategy is more effective than the other
strategy. It is assumed that the regulation bidders would bid their true energy generation
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costs, and that their capacity reservation bids Ri would reflect the corresponding
opportunity costs.
Figure 6.7 shows the variation of the price values for Bidder-2 with application of
the fuzzy strategy in the first sample run, and without the fuzzy strategy in second sample
run.
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Figure 6.7: Plot of price changes for bidder-2 in sample runs

Figure 6.8 shows similar variation for Bidder-3 without application of fuzzy
strategy in first sample run, and with application of fuzzy strategy in second sample run.
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Figure 6.8: Plot of price changes for bidder-2 in sample runs

6.4 Power System Simulation and NERC Compliance
The test system adopted is a three-area system as shown in figure 6.1 earlier with
the given Gencos and Discos. Control area-2 with five Gencos is considered for the
regulation auction market. They are equivalent with the five Supplier Agents in the
auction market with corresponding parameters. The participation of the generators in
area-2 is shown in figure 6.9. The Simulink model for the power system and the results of
the simulation are shown in Appendix A. It is observed that the participating factors of
the generators enabled them to contribute correspondingly to the regulation service and
the system is compliant with NERC’s performance standards as shown by the plots for
CPS1 and CPS2 in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusions
An implementation has been done for the regulation service auction market using
software agent technology. The Java-based multi-agent platform Madkit has been
successfully used to implement competitive procurement of regulation power by the ISO
from the suppliers. A test auction set up having five bidders has been considered for
study of the auction mechanism as well as a couple of bidding strategies employed by the
agents to increase their profit from the market. Simulation results indicate that the fuzzy
bidding strategy provides more effective market catch for the bidder than the random
number strategy.
The participation factors of the generators obtained from this market have been
used for simulating a sample three-area power system compliant with NERC control
performance standards using a fuzzy logic controller that modifies the gain of a PID
controller. Further study in terms of auction mechanism and bidding strategies would
provide better insight into the techniques and market behavior of such automated multi
agent-based systems.

7.2 Recommendations for future work
The initial enhancement over this work would be to implement more bidding
strategies. The fuzzy inference system could be expanded with another variable reflecting
the time of the day during which the auction takes place viz., peak time or off-peak time.
This would enable more precise decisions from the fuzzy system since it would be wise
to increase the bid price when there would be good demand for the commodity. The next
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step would be to implement optimization techniques to improve the functioning of the
ISO as well as bidding agents. The ISO could work on minimizing a cost function and/or
maximizing a social welfare function while the supplier agents work on maximizing their
profit functions.
Also, double auctions could be implemented with Consumer agents trying to buy
regulation power from the ISO as well as trying to enter into bilateral contracts with
Supplier agents thereby reducing the available capacity. Also, similar auctions can be
implemented for the other ancillary services like spinning reserves and replacement
reserves.
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SIMULINK MODELS AND RESULTS OF SIMULATION
MODEL OF TEST SYSTEM WITH THREE AREAS
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Figure A.1: Simulink model of the sample three area system
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% INITIALIZATION FOR THE PARAMETERS IN THE THREE AREA SYSTEM IN MATLAB
%MACHINE PARAMETERS
beta1 = 1.68;
beta2 = 1.9155;
beta3 = 1.6934;
betaSUM = 5.2885;
H1 = 6;
H2 = 3.5;
H3 = 10;
% NERC PARAMETERS
e10 = 0.64/1000;
e1 = 6.2/1000;
L10(1)= sqrt(beta1*betaSUM)*1.65*e10;
L10(2)= sqrt(beta2*betaSUM)*1.65*e10;
L10(3) = sqrt(beta3*betaSUM)*1.65*e10;
tg1 = 35 ; % time constant for supplier i
tg2 = 30 ;
tg3 = 25 ;
%FUZZY SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
proj1matrix = readfis('proj1.fis');
fprintf('\n Initialization Completed');
return;
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GLOSSARY
1. Energy Auction System is defined as a central auction mechanism, which
provides trading opportunities to the market participants and maintains reliability
of operation by coordinating generation, transmission, and distribution functions.
2. Supportive Services are the services used for supporting a reliable delivery of
electric energy in power system operation.
3. Regulation Reserve is the unused capacity of generation that can be made
available for use within a period of 10 minutes.
4. Load Following is defined as the amount of electric energy provided to maintain
the contracted tie line flow and frequency in power system operation during the
trading period. The load following energy is required to respond in 5-10 minutes
of time frame.
5. Forward Market is the trading place where short-term transactions (hourly or
daily transactions) take place.
6. Futures Market is the trading place where long-term transactions (monthly or
yearly transactions) take place.
7. Planning Market is the market that would underwrite the usage of assets (such
as transmission lines) to very long-term commitments (15-20 years or more).
8. Swap Market is the clearinghouse that allows contracts to be terminated with an
exchange of physical or financial substitution.
9. Market Clearing Price is a price at which all valuations of the commodity are in
equilibrium. In the regulation auction, it is the highest price in the energy stack
that clears the forecasted demand value.
10. Control Area is an electric system or systems, bound by interconnection
metering and telemetry, capable of controlling generation to maintain its
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interchange schedule with other control areas and contributing to frequency
regulation of the interconnection.
11. Day-ahead Market is the market involving trading of multi-hour energy blocks
for delivery during the following day. There can be off-peak market and on-peak
market for trading to supply during the off-peak and on-peak hours respectively
during the next day.
12. Operating Reserve is that generating capability over and above the system
demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, forced and
unscheduled outages and local area protection. It consists of spinning and nonspinning reserve. It relates to the short-term ability to meet a given load.
13. Spot Market is a market where good are traded for immediate delivery.
14. Strike Price is the price at which the underlying options contract is bought and
sold in the event the option is exercised.
15. Installed Capacity Reserve relates to the long-term ability of the system to meet
the expected demand requirements. It is the capacity that must be planned and
constructed in advance to provide for uncertainties in the forecast of demand, and
unplanned or unscheduled generation outages.
16. Area Control Error (ACE) is a measure of instantaneous imbalance between
actual and scheduled generation and demand taking into account energy
exchanges with other control areas.
17. Outage refers to the removal of a generating unit from service in order to be
replaced or serviced as a result of a failure. Such events can compromise the
ability of the system to supply the load and affect system reliability. A forced
outage results from emergency conditions requiring the unit to be taken out of
service immediately, while a scheduled outage results when a unit is deliberately
taken out of service for service or preventive maintenance.
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SOURCE CODE FOR AGENT PROGRAMS
C.1 Program ISO.JAVA
THIS PROGRAM IS USED TO SIMULATE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ISO
CONTROLLER IN THE COMPETITIVE AUCTION FOR REGULATION SERVICE.
IT OBTAINS THE BID PRICES FROM THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS,
BUILDS THE ENERGY STACK AND DETERMINES THE MARKET CLEARING
PRICE AND SUBSEQUENT ALLOCATIONS TO SUCCESSFUL BIDDERS.
IT ALSO INTERFACES WITH THE MATLAB ENVIRONMENT.
*/
//package demo.agents.power;
import madkit.kernel.*;
import madkit.lib.graphics.*;
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;
import java.awt.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.awt.event.*;
import java.util.*;
import javax.swing.*;
/* CONTAINS THE BID OF A SUPPLIER. THIS CLASS IS USED BY THE ISO
TO STORE THE PARAMETERS OF THE BIDDERS AND TO OBTAIN THE MCP
FROM THE BIDS OF THE SUPPLIERS */
class BidAnswer {
AgentAddress bidder;
double value;
double ramp;
double alloc;
double reward;
BidAnswer(AgentAddress b, double v)
{
bidder = b;
value = v;
ramp = 0.0;
alloc=0.0;
reward = 0.0;
}
double getValue(){return value;}
void setRamp(double r){ramp = r;}

57

APPENDIX C SOURCE CODE FOR AGENT PROGRAMS

void setAlloc(double s){alloc = s;}
void setReward(double r){reward = r;}
double getRamp(){return ramp;}
double getAlloc(){return alloc;}
double getReward(){return reward;}
AgentAddress getBidder(){return bidder;}
}
/* THE ISO CLASS PERFORMS THE ROLE OF THE ISO CONTROLLER IN THE
REGULATION SERVICE AUCTION. IT RECEIVES THE BID PRICES FROM
THE BIDDERS FOR EACH HOUR, BUILDS THE ENERGY STACK AND FINDS
THE MARKET CLEARING PRICE. IT ALSO DISPATCHES THE ALLOCATIONS
TO THE UNITS AND INITIATES THE INTERFACE WITH MATLAB.
*/
public class ISO extends Agent implements ActionListener
{
int flag = 0;
String product = "utility";
int auction_count;
BidAnswer[] answers;
BidAnswer[] sorted_answers;
static AgentAddress[] bidders,price_agent;
int contract = 0;
JButton b;
int cpt=0;
int cptramp = 0;
AgentAddress client;
FileWriter fw,reward_file;
double reward24[][];
double hour_demand;
double demand_for_day[] = {120, 110, 140, 130, 140, 130, 120, 130, 140, 120,
110, 140, 130, 120, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 120,
110, 130, 140, 120};
static JMatLink engine;
double bidprices[][];
boolean pause = false;
public void enterPause()
{
pause = true;
b.setBackground(Color.red);
b.repaint();
while (pause)
pause(200);
}
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public void initGUI()
{
JPanel p = new JPanel(new BorderLayout());
OPanel o = new OPanel();
p.add("Center",o);
b = new JButton("Next step");
b.addActionListener(this);
p.add("South",b);
setGUIObject(p);
setOutputWriter(o.getOut());
}
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e)
{
pause=false;
b.setBackground(Color.gray);
}
public void activate()
{
println("ISO ready");
enterPause();
joinGroup("power-suppliers");
requestRole("power-suppliers", "ISO");
}
public void handleMessage(ACLMessage m)
{
if (m.getAct().equals("ramp"))
{
receiveRamp(m);
}
else if (m.getAct().equals("bid"))
{
receiveBid(m);
};
}
public void live()
{
println("Opening engine");
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engine = new JMatLink();
engine.engOpen();
engine.engEvalString("fismat=readfis('fuzzybid')");
println("Loaded the Fuzzy Inference System");
pause(3000);
reward24 = new double[5][24];
auction_count = 0; AgentAddress aa2 = null;
while (auction_count < 24)
{
if ( ((auction_count+1)) == 1 | ((auction_count+1) ==21) )
{
println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"st hour");
}
else if ( ((auction_count+1) == 2) | ((auction_count+1) == 22) )
{
println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"nd hour");
}
else if ( ((auction_count+1) == 3) | ((auction_count+1) == 23) )
{
println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"rd hour");
}
else if ( ((auction_count+1) >= 4) | ((auction_count+1) <= 20)
| ((auction_count+1) == 24) )
{
println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"th hour");
};
pause(10000);
//enterPause();
bidders=getAgentsWithRole("power-suppliers",
product+"-supplier");
if (bidders.length==0)
{
println("Not found providers of " + product);
return;
}
println ("Found "+ bidders.length+" suppliers of power from "+product);
cpt = bidders.length;
cptramp = cpt;
answers = new BidAnswer[cpt];
sorted_answers = new BidAnswer[cpt];
// SEND DEMAND VALUE FOR THAT HOUR TO SUPPLIERS
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hour_demand = demand_for_day[auction_count];
println("Demand Value for the hour is " + hour_demand);
println("Sending Demand Value to Suppliers...");
for(int t1=0; t1<bidders.length;t1++)
{
aa2 = bidders[t1];
sendMessage(aa2, new
ACLMessage("demand",String.valueOf(hour_demand)));
}
pause(2000);
// SEND BID REQUESTS TO SUPPLIERS
println ("Sending bid request to all suppliers:");
ACLMessage req=new ACLMessage("request-for-bid",product);
broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-supplier",req);
println ("Waiting for offers..");
pause(8000);
while (cpt > 0)
{
Message m = waitNextMessage();
if (m instanceof ACLMessage)
handleMessage((ACLMessage)m);
else
System.err.println("ERROR: invalid message type: "+ m);
}
requestRamp();
dispatch();
auction_count++;
// ACTIVATE THE BIDPRICE AGENT TO SEND CHANGED
// BID VALUES TO THE SUPPLIERS
if (auction_count < 24)
{
println("Sending message to BidPrice agent...");
ACLMessage req1=new ACLMessage("send-prices",product);
broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-priceagent",req1);
};
if ((auction_count == 23) & (flag == 0))
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{
engine.engPutArray("reward24",reward24);
println("Reward24 written into Matlab");
println("Thank you for using the agent based auction system.\n");
println("\nRunning the system again for another day.\n");
auction_count = 0;
flag = 1;
enterPause();
}
}// FOR THE WHILE AUCTION_COUNT<24 LOOP
// CODE FOR WRITING THE REWARD24 DATA TO MATLAB FOR
// PLOTTING FOR RESULTS
engine.engPutArray("reward24",reward24);
println("Reward24 written into Matlab");
println("Thank you for using the agent based auction system.\n");
println("\nRunning the system again for another day.\n");
}// END BRACES FOR THE LIVE() METHOD
protected void receiveBid(ACLMessage m)
{
println("Received an offer " + m.getContent() + " from " + m.getSender());
cpt--;
answers[cpt]=new BidAnswer(m.getSender(),((Double) new
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue());
}
protected void requestRamp()
{
println ("Sending ramp-rate request to all suppliers:");
ACLMessage req1=new ACLMessage("request-for-ramp",product);
broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-supplier",req1);
println ("Waiting for Ramp-rate values..");
pause(8000);
while (cptramp > 0)
{
Message m1 = waitNextMessage();
if (m1 instanceof ACLMessage)
handleMessage((ACLMessage)m1);
else
System.err.println("ERROR1: invalid message type: "+ m1);
}
}
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protected void receiveRamp(ACLMessage m)
{
println("Received Ramp value from " + m.getSender());
cptramp--;
for (int q = 0; q < answers.length; q++)
{
if (answers[q].getBidder() == m.getSender())
{
double d1 = ((Double) new
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue();
answers[q].setRamp(d1);
}
};
}
void dispatch()
{
AgentAddress aa = null, aa1 = null;
sorted_answers = answers;
BidAnswer temp;
println("Selecting offers from " + sorted_answers.length + " proposals");
pause(4000);
// SORT THE BID ANSWERS OBJECTS ACCORDING TO BID PRIX VALUE
for (int i=0; i<sorted_answers.length;i++)
{
for (int j=(i+1); j<sorted_answers.length;j++)
{
double v1 = sorted_answers[i].getValue();
double v2 = sorted_answers[j].getValue();
if (v1 > v2)
{
temp = sorted_answers[j];
sorted_answers[j] = sorted_answers[i];
sorted_answers[i] = temp;
}
}
}
// PRINT OUT THE SORTED BID VALUES
for(int t=0; t<sorted_answers.length;t++)
{
double f = sorted_answers[t].getValue();
AgentAddress add = sorted_answers[t].getBidder();
double f1 = sorted_answers[t].getRamp();
println("\n" + String.valueOf(f));
};
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double Pdsum = 0.0;
int k1 = 0;
// NOW WE HAVE THE SORTED BIDANSWERS NEXT IS ALLOCATION
println("Building the Load Stack");
for (int k=0; k < sorted_answers.length; k++)
{
double v3 = sorted_answers[k].getRamp();
// calculate supply in 5 min.s
double s = v3 * 5;
Pdsum = Pdsum + s;
if (Pdsum < hour_demand)
{
// set the amount of dispatch given for that unit
sorted_answers[k].setAlloc(s);
// populate the allocation in the unsorted list of bidders
aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder();
for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++)
{
aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder();
if (aa == aa1)
answers[q1].setAlloc(s);
}
}
else if (Pdsum == hour_demand)
{
sorted_answers[k].setAlloc(s);
aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder();
// populate the allocation in the unsorted list od bidders
for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++)
{
aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder();
if (aa == aa1)
answers[q1].setAlloc(s);
}
k1 = k;
break;
}
else if (Pdsum > hour_demand)
{
double d = Pdsum - hour_demand;
sorted_answers[k].setAlloc((s-d));
aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder();
// POPULATE THE ALLOCATION IN THE UNSORTED LIST OF BIDDERS
for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++)
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{
aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder();
if (aa == aa1)
answers[q1].setAlloc((s-d));
}
k1 = k;
break;
}
}
// DETERMINE THE MARKET CLEARING PRICE
// AND SEND IT TO THE SUPPLIERS
double MCP = sorted_answers[k1].getValue();
println("MCP value is " + MCP);
for(int t1=0; t1<sorted_answers.length;t1++)
{
aa = sorted_answers[t1].getBidder();
sendMessage(aa, new ACLMessage("mcp",String.valueOf(MCP)));
}
pause(3000);
// SEND THE ALLOCATION TO EACH BIDDER
for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++)
{
aa = answers[t2].getBidder();
double d2 = answers[t2].getAlloc();
double v2 = answers[t2].getValue();
println("Allocation sent for bidder " + aa + "Amount= " + d2);
sendMessage(aa, new ACLMessage("alloc",String.valueOf(d2)));
// FIND THE REWARD FOR THE ALLOCATED BIDDERS FROM MCP,
// ALLOCATION, AND PRICE VALUES OF THE BIDDERS
// REWARD = (MCP // - PRICE) * ALLOC
double r = (MCP - v2) * d2;
if (r < 0.0) r = 0.0;
answers[t2].setReward(r);
};
bidprices = new double[3][5];
// WRITE THE DATA AS AN ARRAY IN MATLAB
// NOW WE OUTPUT THE BID PRICES OF THE BIDDERS
// FIRST ROW OF BIDPRICES IS PRICE VALUES
// SECOND ROW IS REWARD VALUES
// third row is the choice of the bidder for strategy
for (int t3=0; t3<bidders.length; t3++)
{
for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++)
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{
aa = answers[t2].getBidder();
if (bidders[t3] == aa)
{
double d2 = answers[t2].getReward();
double d3 = answers[t2].getValue();
reward24[t3][auction_count] = d2;
bidprices[0][t3] = d3;
};
};
};
// NOW OUTPUT THE REWARD VALUES OF THE BIDDERS
for (int t3=0; t3<bidders.length; t3++)
{
for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++)
{
aa = answers[t2].getBidder();
if (bidders[t3] == aa)
{
double d2 = answers[t2].getReward();
bidprices[1][t3] = d2;
};
};
};
// Now Output The Selected Bidding Strategy Of The Bidders
for (int t4=0; t4<bidders.length; t4++)
{
bidprices[2][t4] = 0.0;
}
// implement the FIS strategy for the second bidder
//bidprices[2][1] = 1.0;
if (flag == 0)
{
bidprices[2][1] = 1.0;
}
else
{
bidprices[2][2] = 1.0;
}
// PUT BIDPRICES ARRAY INTO MATLAB WORKSPACE
engine.engPutArray("bidprices",bidprices);
println("Matlab written with array");
}// FOR DISPATCH() METHOD
}// FOR ISO.JAVA
***********************************************************************
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C.2 Program SUPPLIER.JAVA
THIS PROGRAM IS USED FOR SIMULATING THE SUPPLIER AGENT IN THE
REGULATION AUCTION. IT GENERATES THE CAPACITY RESERVATION BID
AND THE ENERGY BID, ADDS THEM AND SUBMITS THE RESULT TO THE
ISO AGENT AS THE BID PRICE FOR EVERY HOUR OF AUCTION.
IT PROCURES THE NEW PRICE FROM THE BID PRICE AGENT BEFORE THE
NEXT AUCTION EVERYTIME AFTER THE FIRST HOUR.
*/
//package demo.agents.power;
import java.awt.*;
import java.net.*;
import java.io.*;
import madkit.kernel.*;
import java.util.*;
import javax.swing.*;
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;
public class Supplier extends Agent
{
double prix = 0.0;
//alpha value
double alpha = 0.0;
// beta value
double beta = 0.0;
// gamma value
double gamma = 0.0;
// ramp-rate value for the supplier
double ramp = 0.0;
// unloaded capacity available with the supplier
double unload = 0.0;
double Ei = 0.0;
double Ri = 0.0;
double rand = 0.0;
double rand1 = 0.0;
double MCP = 0.0;
double demand;
String competence;
JLabel message,price1;
public Supplier()
{
// generate random number and populate
// supplier parameters
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rand = Math.random();
competence = "utility";
if (rand >= 0.0 & rand < 0.1)
{
alpha = 78.0;
beta = 7.97;
gamma = 0.005820;
ramp = 6;
unload = 124.4;
};
if (rand >= 0.1 & rand < 0.2)
{
alpha = 75.9;
beta = 8.69;
gamma = 0.001750;
ramp = 8;
unload = 165;
};
if (rand >= 0.2 & rand < 0.3)
{
alpha = 76.9;
beta = 7.92;
gamma = 0.001562;
ramp = 7;
unload = 155.53;
};
if (rand >= 0.3 & rand < 0.4)
{
alpha = 75.5;
beta = 7.68;
gamma = 0.002394;
ramp = 9;
unload = 108.19;
};
if (rand >= 0.4 & rand < 0.5)
{
alpha = 77.8;
beta = 7.85;
gamma = 0.008940;
ramp = 8;
unload = 93.02;
};
if (rand >= 0.5 & rand < 0.6)
{
alpha = 75.9;
beta = 6.34;
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gamma = 0.002394;
ramp = 9;
unload = 135.0;
};
if (rand >= 0.6 & rand < 0.7)
{
alpha = 78.0;
beta = 8.88;
gamma = 0.05572;
ramp = 7;
unload = 98.0;
};
if (rand >= 0.7 & rand < 0.8)
{
alpha = 76.8;
beta = 9.71;
gamma = 0.002820;
ramp = 8;
unload = 180.0;
};
if (rand >= 0.8 & rand < 0.9)
{
alpha = 75.5;
beta = 7.97;
gamma = 0.005820;
ramp = 10;
unload = 175.53;
};
if (rand >= 0.9)
{
alpha = 77.8;
beta = 8.69;
gamma = 0.001750;
ramp = 6;
unload = 130.5;
};
// MARGINAL COST PER ENERGY UNIT
// MCI = EI = B + C * PG
// THIS IS THE ENERGY BID EI
Ei = beta + ( (2 * gamma) * unload);
// POWER VALUE FOR OPPORTUNITY GENERATION FOR 5 MINS
double opp_Pg = ramp * 5;
// CAPACITY BID PRICE RI FOR THE BIDDING SUPPLIER
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//RI = BETA + (2 * (GAMMA * OPP_PG);
Ri = beta + (2 * (gamma * opp_Pg));
// PUT THE VALUE TO THE INITIAL VALUE FOR PRODUCTION
// BY THE SUPPLIER
prix = Ri + Ei;
}
public void initGUI()
{
JPanel p= new JPanel();
p.setLayout(new BoxLayout(p,BoxLayout.Y_AXIS));
// add the bid price to the GUI
p.add(price1 = new JLabel("Price: "+ prix));
p.add( new JLabel("Ramp: " + ramp));
p.add( new JLabel("Ei: " + Ei));
p.add( new JLabel("Ri: " + Ri));
p.add(message = new JLabel("
message.setOpaque(true);
p.setSize(170,100);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);

"));

setGUIObject(p);
}
public void activate()
{
joinGroup("power-suppliers");
requestRole("power-suppliers",competence+"-supplier");
display("Power: "+competence);
}
public void display(String s)
{
if (hasGUI())
message.setText(s);
else
println(s);
}
public void display_price(String s)
{
if (hasGUI())
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price1.setText(s);
else
println(s);
}
protected void handleMessage(ACLMessage m)
{
Color bkg=message.getBackground();
// RESPONSE FOR REQUEST FOR BID MESSAGE FROM ISO
if (m.getAct().equals("request-for-bid"))
{
debug("s"+m.getSender());
debug("r"+m.getReceiver());
display("Sending bid");
pause(4000);
message.setBackground(Color.yellow);
// send the bid value to the ISO
sendMessage(m.getSender(),
new ACLMessage("bid",String.valueOf(prix)));
display("Bid value sent");
pause(2000);
display_price("Price: "+ prix);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);
display("Power: "+competence);
}
// RESPONSE FOR REQUEST FOR RAMP MESSAGE FROM ISO
else if (m.getAct().equals("request-for-ramp"))
{
debug("s"+m.getSender());
debug("r"+m.getReceiver());
display("Sending ramp");
pause(4000);
message.setBackground(Color.yellow);
// send the ramp value to the ISO
sendMessage(m.getSender(),
new ACLMessage("ramp",String.valueOf(ramp)));
display("Ramp value sent");
pause(2000);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);
display("Power: "+competence);
}
// RESPONSE FOR MARKET CLEARING PRICE MESSAGE FROM ISO
else if (m.getAct().equals("mcp"))
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{
MCP = ((Double) new Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue();
display("MCP value received: " + MCP);
}
// RESPONSE FOR MESSAGE WITH NEW PRICE
// OBTAINED USING THE BIDDING STRATEGY
// USING MATLAB FROM BIDPRICE AGENT
else if (m.getAct().equals("newprice"))
{
// Check for condition for no loss to supplier in
// the auction
double temp;
temp = ((Double) new Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue();
if (temp < Ri)
{
prix = Ri;
}
else
{
prix = temp;
}
display_price("Price: "+ prix);
display("New price received");
message.setBackground(Color.yellow);
pause(2000);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);
display("Power: "+competence);
}
// RESPONSE FOR MESSAGE WITH FORECASTED
// DEMAND VALUE FROM ISO
else if (m.getAct().equals("demand"))
{
demand = ((Double) new
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue();
display("Demand value received: " + demand);
}
// response for message with allocation from ISO
else if (m.getAct().equals("alloc"))
{
double a = ((Double) new
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue();
// Calculate the participation
double p = a/demand;
// calculate and display the reward
pause(1000);
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double reward = (MCP - prix) * a;
display("Reward " + reward);
}
}// end of handleMessage() method
public void live()
{
while (true) {
Message m = waitNextMessage();
if (m instanceof ACLMessage)
handleMessage((ACLMessage)m);
}
}
}
***********************************************************************

C.3 Program BIDPRICE.JAVA
THIS PROGRAM IS USED TO PROCURE THE NEW BID PRICES FROM
MATLAB THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS ACCORDING TO THE STRATEGY
EMPLOYED BY EACH OF THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS, AND PASSES
THE VALUES AS MESSAGES TO THE RESPECTIVE SUPPLIER AGENTS.
*/
//package demo.agents.power;
import java.awt.*;
import java.net.*;
import java.io.*;
import madkit.kernel.*;
import java.util.*;
import javax.swing.*;
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;
public class BidPrice extends Agent
{
double rand = 0.0;
double rand1 = 0.0;
double MCP = 0.0;
double demand;
double new_prices[][];
String competence;
JLabel message,price1;
FileReader fr;
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BufferedReader br;
public BidPrice()
{
competence = "utility";
}
public void initGUI()
{
JPanel p1= new JPanel();
p1.setLayout(new BoxLayout(p1,BoxLayout.Y_AXIS));
p1.add(message = new JLabel("
"));
message.setOpaque(true);
p1.setSize(170,100);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);
setGUIObject(p1);
}
public void activate()
{
joinGroup("power-suppliers");
requestRole("power-suppliers",competence+"-priceagent");
display("Power: "+"price-agent");
}
public void display(String s)
{
if (hasGUI())
message.setText(s);
else
println(s);
}
protected void handleMessage(ACLMessage m)
{
Color bkg=message.getBackground();
String s="";
// OBTAIN REQUEST FOR BID MESSAGE FROM ISO
if (m.getAct().equals("send-prices"))
{
debug("s"+m.getSender());
debug("r"+m.getReceiver());
message.setBackground(Color.yellow);
// INTERFACE WITH MATLAB AND RUN ROUTINE
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// price_change.m
ISO.engine.engEvalString("price_change");
display("Finding new prices...");
pause(500);
// OBTAIN THE NEW PRICES ARRAY FROM MATLAB
new_prices = ISO.engine.engGetArray("curr_prices");
display("current prices received");
pause(500);
// SEND THE NEW BID VALUES TO THE SUPPLIERS
AgentAddress aa2;
for(int t1=0; t1<ISO.bidders.length;t1++)
{
aa2 = ISO.bidders[t1];
sendMessage(aa2, new
ACLMessage("newprice",String.valueOf(new_prices[0][t1])));
pause(500);
}
display("New Bid values sent");
pause(2000);
message.setBackground(Color.lightGray);
display("Power: "+"price-agent");
}
}
public void live()
{
while (true) {
Message m = waitNextMessage();
if (m instanceof ACLMessage)
handleMessage((ACLMessage)m);
}
}
}
***********************************************************************
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